In the year 2000, the U.S. Congress provided a $1.3 billion package of assistance to enable Colombia to grapple more effectively with its ongoing security problems. 1 The intent of this legislation, which came to be known as Plan Colombia , was to help address the counterdrug "war" in Colombia. The intent was also to encourage serious complementary Colombian and international actions to address the political, economic, and social instability generated out of Colombia's other two "wars"-the "war" against so-called paramilitary self-defense forces and the "war" against a 50-year-old insurgency. 2 Even before President William J. Clinton asked the Congress for a major 2-year assistance program for Colombia, that country was the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid money, after Egypt and Israel. 3 As a consequence, many Americans-and others-at all levels, have begun to ask, "Why Colombia, why now, and what is to be done?" Before answering these questions, strategic leaders and thinkers, policymakers, and opinionmakers must be clear on what a situation such as that in Colombia is and what it is not. This, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is "the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive." 4 Given that determination, senior leaders and their staffs can correctly identify and prioritize centers of gravity and link policy, strategy, force structure and equipment, and campaign plans to achieve strategic clarity and solve the central strategic problem. This monograph, then, seeks to explain the Colombian situation with an eye toward strategic clarity and what Sun Tzu would call "the perfection of strategy." 5 traces its conceptual origins back to these fundamental tenets.
The Major Tenets . The No-Transfer Resolution of 1811 reflected concern that Spain might transfer Florida to Great Britain. Foreshadowing the Monroe Doctrine, this resolution made it clear that the United States "cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power." 8 The Monroe Doctrine broadened the 1811 prohibition of a Floridato-Great Britain territorial transfer so as to embrace all western hemisphere territory and all other extracontinental powers. Its key phrase asserted, ". . . we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." 9 As one relatively recent example of the application of that doctrine in Latin America, President Lyndon Johnson implicitly invoked this doctrine in 1965 in connection with preventing the establishment of a communist government in the Dominican Republic:
I think it is a well-known and advertised doctrine of the Hemisphere that the principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of our inter-American system. President Kennedy enunciated that on several occasions. The Organization of American States enunciated that. I merely repeated it. 10 Yet, justifications of U.S. interventions, especially since the end of the Cold War, are more reminiscent of the Roosevelt and Wilson Corollaries than the Monroe Doctrine itself. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt was concerned about instability in the Western Hemisphere. He declared that "chronic wrongdoing, or impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty." 11 Under these terms, the United States interfered imperiously and repeatedly in such places as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 12 Actions of the Wilson administration, its predecessors, and successors generated additional interventions in the Caribbean Basin in the early 1900s. It is argued that the application of the Wilson Corollary in Latin American affairs brought "the gospel of democracy and morality to all concerned whether they wanted it or not." 13 The application of this policy, in conjunction with the Roosevelt Corollary, included the occupation of the port of Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914; the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934; and the occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1912 to 1933. The intent, even then, was to establish the bases of democracy and restore financial and political stability.
14 At the same time, U.S. policy toward Latin America demonstrated that the Panama Canal and the sea lanes connecting the east and west coasts of the continental United States must remain in U.S. or friendly hands. This strategic concept was the underpinning of President Dwight Eisenhower's support for the 1954 overthrow of the "leftist" Arbenz government in Guatemala. As already noted, it was also the basis for President Johnson's political justification of the 1965 invasion of The Dominican Republic. 15 Nevertheless, the argument for protecting the United States and the hemisphere from an extra-continental power has receded into the background more and more since 1965.
Because of the end of the Cold War and the concomitant major power confrontations in the Western Hemisphere, recent U.S. interventions in the Caribbean Basin have been discussed more in the Wilsonian and Rooseveltian terms of "democracy," "morality," "instability," and "human rights" than in the Monrovian expressions of concern regarding territorial threats from a "foreign" power. The U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Haiti in 1994 are cases in point. 16 The concept of responding to traditional threats from extra-continental powers has given way to countering nonterritorial threats from "hostile" or "disruptive" hemispheric governments and political actors.
Additionally, the broad behavioral pattern of recent indirect U.S. involvement in Latin America includes giving democracy a chance in countries such as Grenada, Panama, and Haiti; training military and/or police forces and working for economic development in the hope of creating political stability throughout the entire hemisphere; and restoring financial order in Brazil and Mexico. 17 Nevertheless, and despite the justifying rhetoric, the basic causal linkage between instability anywhere in the hemisphere and a threat to U.S. security has been-and continues to be-the cognitive bedrock of U.S. policy toward Latin America in general and toward Colombia now and in the future. 18 Conclusions . In the past, security has been achieved primarily as a result of maintaining what Lars Schoultz calls strategic access and denial. 19 That is, strategic access to the Western Hemisphere for the United States and strategic denial of the region to extra-continental adversaries or potential adversaries. More recently, the United States has expanded that concept to include hostile-and disruptive-hemispheric governments and other political actors. The United States has thus not suffered gladly governments or actors that threaten or undermine the development of a stable, democratic, and prosperous hemispheric community. U.S. support for the 1974 overthrow of the "destabilizing" government of Salvador Allende in Chile is one example. U.S. support for the 1981 coup against the "narco" government of General Luis Garcia Meza in Bolivia is another. The leftist government of Fidel Castro in Cuba is obviously something of an exception-but gladly is the operative word in this case.
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Broadening the Concept of Security.
When what mattered most in U.S. policy toward Latin America was maintaining military bases and preserving access to sea lanes of communication, choke points, raw materials, and hydrocarbons and denying these assets to an enemy or its surrogates, the United States could generally ignore internal conditions in specific countries. This was the U.S. stance toward Latin American until the early 1960s. Policymakers, decisionmakers, and opinionmakers could be content with "good partner" regimes in key countries-even if those regimes were undemocratic and corrupt. 21 A violent example of the Latin American reaction to this policy was seen in anti-American demonstrations and mobbing and spitting on Vice-President Richard Nixon during his visit to Latin America in April 1958. Remarkably, an ex-president of Costa Rica, normally supportive of the United States, justified the Latin American behavior toward Nixon at that time by arguing that the United States had first spat on Latin America by bolstering, decorating, and even sheltering torture-chamber dictators. He further argued that Latin America could not spit on the United States-all that could be done was to take out its frustrations on the vice-president.
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Additional Factors for the Contemporary Security Equation . Now, in 2001, the United States is also seriously concerned about the western hemisphere's development of democratic and free market institutions and human rights; cooperation on shared problems such as illegal drugs, the environment, and refugees; and the ability of others to buy North American and Latin American products. As a result, the United States must concern itself with nontraditional internal national and regional well-being. 23 In this connection, the national security strategy of the United States now and over the past several years states that the principal U.S. security concerns in Latin America are internal and transnational in nature and have serious implications for national and regional well-being. They include illegal drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, firearms and human trafficking, and terrorism. Additionally, North Americans are beginning to recognize the dangers to national and regional stability produced by corruption, ineffective legal systems, and illegitimate governance.
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All of these threats-especially drug traffickingproduce adverse social effects that undermine the sovereignty, democracy, stability, well-being, and security of all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States. 25 The notion that a criminal activity such as illegal drug trafficking could constitute a threat to national security may seem odd at first. It is generally perceived that narcotics dealers do not present an overt physical threat to the people or territory of a nation-state. Accordingly, the illegal drug industry has not been considered an inherent national security threat. Yet, the potential for the illegal drug trafficking industry to destroy social mores and produce dysfunctional behavior in a society has a direct bearing on the political process. As it undermines vital institutional pillars of regime stability, the internal and transnational narcotics industry presents a challenge to the control of any country thus affected. This, in turn, generates security problems for producer countries, consumer countries, transit countries, and the global community.
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Illustrations from the Hemisphere . Two examples evolving out of the Colombian situation should suffice to make the point. First, with billions of dollars in revenues, Colombian narco-traffickers have bribed, intimidated, kidnapped, and assassinated government leaders, judges, law enforcement and military officials, journalists, citizens, and even soccer players. They have infiltrated and suborned the institutional pillars of regime stability such as the civil bureaucracy, the courts, the police, and the army. They have also provided ingratiating patronage to the poor and directly manipulated and distorted the democratic political process. As a consequence, they have made a concerted effort to slow down and/or paralyze the government and establish themselves as an untouchable entity above the state. 27 Indeed, it has been argued that the illegal narcotics industry in Colombia and elsewhere is a "state within the state."
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In this sense, illegal drug trafficking is not simply a criminal activity. It is more than that. It has created major political-psychological-economic-social-moral conflicts and presents a clear and present threat to the existence of the state as we know it. 29 Second, the spillover effects of the illegal drug industry have inspired violence, corruption, and instability throughout Latin America in general and Caribbean transit countries in particular. The 1992 report by the West Indian Commission captures the essence of the scope and gravity of this "equal opportunity" phenomenon:
Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbean] countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the magnitude of the damage that drug abuse and trafficking hold for our Community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade in relatively poor societies. On top of all this lie the implications for governance itself-at the hands of both external agencies engaged in inter-national interdiction, and the drug barons themselves-the "dons" of the modern Caribbean-who threaten governance from within. 30 Thus, Colombia is of particular importance because the illegal drug trade represents a dual threat to the authority of that government-and to those of its neighbors. It challenges the central governance of countries affected, and it undermines the vital institutional pillars of regime legitimacy and stability. 31 Conclusions . Colombia's and, by extension, Latin America's contemporary importance to the United States has major implications for policy in 2001 and beyond. It suggests that the United States must concern itself with the region's social, economic, and political conditions. Yet, it is not enough to consider the need for political reform and socio-economic development. Because the illegal drug industry, insurgent groups, and paramilitary "self-defense" organizations are all firmly established, a targeted government such as that of Colombia has no choice but to institute more direct military-police actions to destroy or neutralize these threats to its security. Thus, the security task appears more and more to consist of two highly interrelated elements. It involves dealing with both the root causes and the violent consequences of instability. At the most fundamental level, however, the real threat would come from failing to recognize and respond-at the highest levels-to the dangers that instability poses to Colombia and the rest of the interdependent global community.
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As a consequence, internal and transnational conflict-to include the so-called drug war-can no longer be considered essentially a short-term, low-level law enforcement effort. Rather, it is a long-term intranational , national, and transnational conflict involving Clausewitz's multiple "forgotten" political-economic-social-psychological dimensions of strategy. 33 The challenge in redefining the term "security," then, is to understand that it operates on three different levels. First, security must be considered to be protection and preservation of a people's freedom from external military attack and coercion perpetrated by traditional state actors-and from subversion and the erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values perpetrated by internal and transnational non-state political actors. Second, according to these terms, security is multidimensional and transnational and must be understood and dealt with as such. Third and finally, security is a problem that may involve multiple internal, external, and transnational enemies. As such, security is complex and ambiguous, requiring rethinking objectives, ways, and means of achieving it. Since the early 19th century, the primary interests of the United States in Latin America have been to encourage, maintain, and enhance a stable, peaceful, and secure southern flank. At the same time, U.S. national security policy remains firmly committed to the interdependent regional objectives of democracy and free-market economic progress.
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The rationale for the expansion of the concept of security from maintaining military defenses against external military threats to include internal political, economic, and social concerns is the realization that U.S. security is inextricably tied to the stability, prosperity, and well-being of the interdependent hemispheric and global communities. 36 Unfortunately, the tendency has been to take a business-as-usual, ad hoc, and piecemeal "crisis management" approach rather than a proactive approach to the achievement of these objectives.
"Why Colombia? " Within the hemispheric context, Colombia is important to the United States because of its potential for further development of democratic and free-market institutions and improvement of human rights standards; its potential for increasing (legal) bilateral trade; and its potential for cooperation on shared problems such as illegal drugs, illegal immigration, and environmental issues. More specifically, Colombia is an important U.S. trading partner and a key factor in the Latin American and global economic equations.
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To illustrate Colombia's importance economically: Colombia's legal two-way trade with the United States amounts to $10 billion per year; it is South America's fourth-largest economy; and it provides the fifth-largest U.S. export market in Latin America. Moreover, the Western Hemisphere accounts for nearly 40 percent of the United States' two-way world trade, compared to 33 percent for the Pacific Rim and 21 percent for Europe. 38 Another crucial fact is that two of the four largest suppliers of energy to the United States are Venezuela and Colombia. Within the interdependent global economy and security environments, the argument is uncomplicated. That is, as these interests are maintained and enhanced in Colombia, they enhance the stability, prosperity, and well-being of the Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. However, to the extent that these interests are not maintained and enhanced in Colombia, they degrade the potential of the region and the world. 39 Clearly, significant interests are at stake.
"After Nearly 50 Years of Internal Instability and Drug-Related Turmoil in Colombia, Why Is the United States Now Becoming More Seriously Interested in Helping
That Country? " The problem, at the moment, is that Colombia (including its potential), is deteriorating because three simultaneous and interrelated wars-insurgency, illegal drug trafficking, and growing vigilante paramilitary movements-are directly threatening the democracy, economic progress, and social fabric of that country. Internal deterioration may be illustrated by three facts. First, violence associated directly with internal turmoil is claiming over 3,500 lives every year. Second, violence is generating over 1.5 million displaced persons and 800,000 emigrants who are finding new homes in other countries in Latin America, the United States, Europe, and Canada. Third, Colombia's internal turmoil is also inducing a contracting economy that declined by more than 5 percent in 1999 and has produced 20 percent unemployment and the worst recession since the 1930s. 40 Colombia's three simultaneous wars (think of the "Hobbesian Trinity") also indirectly threaten the stability and well-being of its neighbors. In this connection, narco-traffickers have for some time operated back and forth across Colombia's borders and have taken with them violence, corruption, and criminality wherever they have gone. Colombian insurgents and paramilitary groups have also made frequent incursions into the neighboring countries of Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
The resulting violence and instability are undermining the sovereignty, security, and well-being of these countries. 41 Another negative result of turmoil in Colombia and the region-the abundant flow of narcotics into the United States to satisfy its great demand-is sufficiently obvious and well documented not to require much elaboration. Suffice it to note that illegal drug use in the United States kills some 52,000 people every year, and costs are estimated at $100 billion to $500 billion per year in the United States for illegal drug-related health care and accidents. 42 Most significant, there is now explicit recognition that Colombia's current situation has reached crisis proportions, though an alarmist prognosis would probably be counterproductive. Yet, it would be irresponsible not to note that the illegal drug trafficking and paramilitary and insurgent organizations are perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, humanitarian horror, and internal instability that-if left unchecked-can ultimately threaten the collapse of the Colombian state and undermine the political sovereignty of its neighbors. Colombian contribution to make up the balance of the entire $7.5 billion package has not been spelled out. In that connection, operational-level activities addressing problems such as crop substitution, judicial reform, and human rights abuses appear to be based on "crisis control" rather than a coherent, coordinated plan of action. This dysfunctional approach is failing to reconcile the aspirations listed in Plan Colombia with the reality of the strategic situation in the country and the region. As a consequence, the illegal drug trafficking industry continues to be strong, ruthless, adaptable, and wealthy-and continues to exploit the weaknesses of the government. In turn, there is considerable confusion, frustration, and ambiguity concerning the intent, objectives, and viability of the plan. 44 A lack of cooperative, holistic, and strategic-level involvement within Colombia is generating great risks for that country and the world around it. In light of the dynamics of Colombia's Hobbesian Trinity, there is ample reason for worldwide concern. At this time, the Colombian focus on the operational, micro-level, drug war security question in the short term, leaving strategic macro-level security, political, economic, and social issues to be dealt with in the future-by others-leaves much to be desired. The Colombian drug issue is only one piece of a larger and more complex strategic puzzle. Solving that puzzle will require a long-term and holistic strategic solution. It is time for the United States, Colombia, and the global community to go beyond the present uncertainties of Plan Colombia and deal more vigorously and cooperatively with an urgent strategic agenda that greatly affects the interdependent global economic, political, and security arena. 45 Conclusions . The strategic ambiguity and general confusion reflected in the questions about "Why Colombia, why now, and what is to be done?" are the results of two common denominators: (1) a radically different security environment than that addressed, and (2) the lack of a strategic,cooperative, holistic, and long-term foreign policy and military strategy to deal with that environment. The crisis situation in Colombia is not simply and singly the result of illegal drug production and trafficking. That is only one of the consequences of long-standing political, economic, and social inequities that have spawned that country's Hobbesian Trinity of three simultaneous wars. Thus, what must be attempted in Colombia will require considerable effort in several different dimensions-political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and stabilitysecurity-simultaneously. Unless these macro-level issues are addressed cooperatively, holistically, and strategically, Colombia's three wars will continue indefinitely. And, as Sun Tzu reminds us, the attendant national, regional, and global deterioration will work to the benefit of no one. What is required, then, is a combined civil-military effort to apply the full human and physical resources of cooperating nations to generate the real well-being of Colombia and its political, economic, and geographic neighbors. In these terms, the attempt to resolve the conflict in Colombia cannot be a strictly operational-level, military-police effort. Clausewitz's translator, Michael Howard, reminds us that an adequate response must be essentially a strategic political-economic-moral-security effort. The most refined tactical doctrine and operational art carried out by the optimum military or police structure in pursuit of a policy that ignores the strategic whole-to include the populace-will be irrelevant.
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It must also be remembered that if one wants strategic clarity to optimize effectiveness, one must precede tactical and operational efforts with relevant policy direction-and a strategy, an organizational structure, and appropriate tools of power. 48 Some Fundamental Requirements for a Grand Strategy . Success in countering the chaos of the Colombian crisis and fulfilling the hope for national, regional, and global well-being will be constructed on the same pillars that supported favorable results in the past. These pillars of success are conceptual, organizational, and operational. They form the foundation for a strategic paradigm for engagement, unity of effort, and holistic multidimensional and multinational organizations and programs designed to promote and consolidate political, economic, social, and security legitimization efforts.
In the past, the United States worked hard to develop strategic paradigms (i.e., theories of engagement). As an example, a great deal of intellectual energy, national debate, and writing, to say nothing of war gaming, went into the question of how and under what circumstances the United States could politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily deter and contain the Soviet Union. Now, the United States must seek to understand a new central strategic problem and, in the counterdrug case, be able to deal with more than the strictly law enforcement aspects of hemispheric security. Theories of engagement are as important for success in "unconventional conflict" as they are in conventional war. This is the first conceptual requirement. 49 Second, the United States developed an executive branch management organizational structure to implement the strategic paradigm that brought both military and civilian assets to the field of confrontation with the former enemy. In this connection, government must restructure itself to the extent necessary to establish the appropriate political organization to achieve an effective unity of effort and ensure that the application of the various civilian and military instruments of power directly contribute to the achievement of the political end-state dictated by the strategic paradigm. Generating a more complete unity of effort requires contributions at the international level as well.
Critical organizational points are: (1) Colombia and its internal and external allies must be in general agreement as to what the central strategic problem is; (2) these parties must be in general agreement on national goals and an associated set of programs designed to contribute directly to the achievement of the mutually agreed-upon end-state; (3) these requirements reflect the need for an international organizational structure for improved coordination and cooperation between Colombia and its internal and external allies; and (4) all of this requires mutual cultural awareness and sensitivity. Otherwise, the various national and international civil-military actions will work at cross-purposes, be counter-productive, and/or be irrelevant.
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These points are primarily organizational requirements.
Third, the United States worked very hard to generate the conceptual, technological, and industrial capability to produce major direct and indirect political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police instruments of power that were both offensive and defensive. The intent was to support the deterrence and containment strategies that came out of George F. Kennan's strategic paradigm for the containment of the Soviet Union. 51 Today, the United States must develop and incorporate the appropriate instruments of power by which the root causes and consequences of Colombia's instability might be neutralized. Present-day actions are meant to influence significantly the society and political system of a country such as Colombia to help the government regain control of its own territory, society, and political system-not an attempt by the United States to gain some sort of political, economic, or territorial concession.
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These are primarily operational requirements.
Conclusions . Strategic paradigms, organizational structure, and appropriate instruments of power to implement the follow-on strategies and effect the necessary cooperation and coordination of effort should not be considered relics of a bygone era. Indeed, those civilian and military leaders assigned to the difficult but urgent task of developing and implementing U.S. national security policy and strategies now and in the future would do well to rethink and apply these fundamental strategic components of success to the requirements of the contemporary international security environment-and that of Colombia. In September 2000, President Clinton opened the summit meeting of world leaders at the United Nations. On that occasion, he urged the gathering to prepare national and international institutions for a new age in which unilateral and multilateral forces will have to "reach regularly and rapidly inside national boundaries to protect threatened people." 54 The president was responding to the realities of the so-called "new world disorder." Those realities center on the idea that although contemporary conflict is political-psychological-moral, it is also violent.
Thus, the military has an important role to play in any given conflict situation, especially that of Colombia. That role, however, must be based on the correct identification of a range of actions and in proper proportions-that are subordinated to and in support of the larger political, economic, social, and security components of such a conflict. Thus, political and military leaders, planners, and implementers would do well to recognize that in fighting a foe today and in the future, the situation has changed. Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia today is no exception to the rule of change. 55 We can see that in the following seven ways.
Ambiguity . First, the definitions of "enemy" and "victor" are elusive, and there is a lack of consensus on the use of "power" to secure, maintain, and enhance vital interests. Underlying these ambiguities is the fact that contemporary conflict is more often than not an intra-state affair that international law and convention are only beginning to address. A part of one society is pitted against another. In these so-called "teacup" wars, 56 the following clear-cut conditions do not apply or are not present; therefore there are (1) normally no formal declaration or termination of conflict, (2) no easily identified human foe to attack and destroy, (3) no specific territory to take and hold, (4) no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, (5) no legal niceties such as mutually recognized national borders and Geneva Conventions to help control the situation, (6) no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending authorities will be honored, and (7) no specific rules to guide leadership in a given "engagement" process. These aspects of the global security environment in general and in the Colombian context in particular are not only complex, they are ambiguous.
The Need to Redefine "Enemy," "Power," and "Victory ." Second, as a consequence, there is a need to redefine "enemy," "power," and "victory." The enemy is no longer a recognizable military entity or an industrial capability to make traditional war. The enemy now becomes "violence" and the causes of violence. Thus, the purposes of power have changed. Power is not simply "hard" combat fire power directed at a traditional enemy military formation or industrial complex. Power is multi-layered, combining "hard" and "soft" political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, societal, military, police, and civil bureaucratic activities that can be brought to bear appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetrators of violence. And victory is no longer the acknowledged destruction of an enemy's military capability. Victory (or success) is now-more frequently, and perhaps with a bit of "spin control"-defined as the achievement of stability and a "sustainable peace."
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Plan Colombia is a case in point.
A New Center of Gravity . Third, these ambiguities intrude on the comfortable vision of war in which the assumed center of gravity has been enemy military formations and the physical capability to conduct war. Clausewitz reminds us, however, that "in countries subject to domestic strife . . . and popular uprisings, the [center of gravity] is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our energies should be directed." 58 Thus, in contemporary intranational conflict, the primary center of gravity changes from a familiar military concept to an ambiguous and uncomfortable multidimensional political-economic-psychologicalsecurity paradigm. Again, the Colombian situation is no exception to the Clausewitzian dictum.
Asymmetry . Fourth, strategic asymmetry is the use of disparity between contending parties to gain an advantage. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson have defined strategic asymmetry as: acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions. 59 Asymmetry is a concept as old as war itself, but some military officers and political leaders don't like it. They argue that asymmetry is not fighting fair. That is unfortunate. What many first world military and political leaders seem not to have learned is that contemporary drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitaries-such as those operating in Colombia-can be what Ralph Peters calls "wise competitors." He argues, Wise competitors will not even attempt to defeat us on our terms; rather, they will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations or turn to terrorism and nontraditional forms of assault on our national integrity. Only the foolish will fight fair. 60 Conflict Has Become Multidimensional, Multilateral, and Multiorganizational . Fifth, the conflictive means to secure, maintain, and enhance interests abroad have become multidimensional, multilateral, and multiorganizational. The conflict in Colombia is not a military-to-military confrontation. That conflict now involves the entire population as well as a large number of national civilian, military, and police agencies, other national civilian organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and subnational indigenous actors who must work together to deal effectively with complex internal and transnational threats to security, peace, and well-being.
As a result, a viable unity of effort is required to coordinate the multilateral, multidimensional, and multiorganizational effort necessary for successful engagement in the contemporary interdependent world. Because of the difficulty in achieving it, that ideal has rarely been achieved in the past. Nevertheless, in this changed and infinitely more complex security arena, governments and their functional agencies, the various NGOs, and the diverse international organizations involved in the pursuit of stability, peace, and well-being must make the necessary effort to develop ways and means of working toward a more effective unity.
61
Deterrence . Sixth, threats associated with the growing sophistication of biological, chemical, and cyber war are intensifying. At the same time, other "nontraditional" threats and menaces emanating from virtually a thousand different political actors with a cause-and the will to conduct asymmetrical warfare-are spreading havoc throughout the global community. The deterrence task is straightforward. Culturally effective ways and means must be found to convince Colombia's "nontraditional" narco-traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary players that it is not in their best interests-whatever those may be-to continue their negative behavior. Deterrence is not necessarily military-although that is important. It is not necessarily negative or directly coercive-although that, too, is important. Deterrence is broader than that. Deterrence is the creation of a state of mind that either encourages one thing or discourages something else. Under these terms, motives and culture as well as weapons and tactics become crucial.
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Contemporary "War" Is Not Limited; It Is Total . Seventh, contemporary nontraditional "conflict" is not a kind of appendage (a lesser or limited thing) to the more comfortable military paradigm. It is a great deal more. As long as opposition exists in Colombia or anywhere else which is willing to risk all to take down a government violently and establish one more to its own liking, there is war. This is a zero-sum game in which there is only one winner. It is, thus, total. In his novel, The Centurians , Jean Larteguy vividly captures the difference between traditional warfare designed to achieve limited political, economic, or territorial concession and the totality of the type of threats we confront today. He contrasts the French (traditional) and the Vietminh (total) methods of securing vital interests in the following passage:
It is difficult to explain exactly, but it is rather like [the card game] bridge as compared to belote . When we [the French] make war, we play belote with 32 cards in the pack. But the Viet Minh's game is bridge and they have 52 cards-20 more than we do. Those 20 cards short will always prevent us from getting the better of them. They've got nothing to do with traditional [military] warfare, they're marked with the signs of POLITICS, PROPAGANDA, FAITH, AGRARIAN REFORM . . . What's biting [the French officer]? I think he is beginning to realize that we've got to play with 52 cards and he doesn't like it at all. . . . Those extra cards aren't at all to his liking. 63 Conclusions . These are the realities for now and into the next century. As the United States and its armed forces transition over the next months and years to deal more effectively with the requirements of the 21st century, we should contemplate the problems of threat and response in the terms outlined above. The consequences of failing to do so are clear. Unless thinking and actions are reoriented to deal with those realities, the problems of global, regional, and sub-regional (Colombian) stability and security will resolve themselves-stability and security will be gone along with the complicated problems they present.
Implications, Part 3: The Strategic Adaptation of U.S. Military Efficacy to the Colombian Threat Environment.
The earlier two sections dealing with Implications set forth fundamental strategic civil-military directions and additional imperatives that should inform the debate on what is to be done in Colombia. They also provide direction in terms of the nontraditional and complex threat that requires a change of perspective from unilateral responses to multilateral and highly coordinated responses; from primarily blunt police and military tools of power to finer, people-oriented instruments of action; and from ad hoc and piecemeal crisis management to deliberate and holistic commitments of resources and will.
The third set of Implications concerns the strategic application of U.S. military power. At the outset, however, it should be noted that the ultimate responsibility for reversing the political-economic-social-security deterioration of that country and setting it on a more positive course lies with Colombians. As Michael Shifter argues, "They have borne the enormous costs of the country's decline-and they will enjoy the fruits of whatever progress it makes." 64 Yet, the United States, as the crucial interested outside actor, has indispensable experience, resources, and political clout. The judicious application of lessons learned from relevant experiences similar to those of Colombia could make the difference between success and failure of the Colombian armed forces in helping to achieve the political-economic-social-security regeneration of their country. Key lessons learned center on professional military education and leader development.
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In these teacher, mentor, and role model terms, U.S. military forces can act as a major positive influence for enhancing and strengthening democracy, stability, and peace in Colombia.
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The Central Strategic Problem . Thus, we come back to where we began. We return to Clausewitz's first and most comprehensive of all strategic questions which is crucial to understanding the central political problem. 67 Democracy, stability, and sustainable peace depend on effective and legitimate control of the national territory and the people in it. The Colombian government must achieve that control in a manner that safeguards the human rights, civil liberties, and personal security of all its citizens. At the same time, the government must enhance its political legitimacy, provide economic progress, and engender social justice. Sun Tzu reminds us, "Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means, they make their governments invincible."
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For the Colombian government to accomplish these formidable tasks within the context of illegal insurgent, narco-trafficker, and paramilitary violence, it must do two things. First, it must professionalize and modernize the country's police forces and judicial system to the point where they can enforce and administer the law fairly and effectively throughout the entire country. Second, the government must professionalize and modernize the military to a level where it has the capability to neutralize and/or destroy the illegal perpetrators of violence throughout the national territory. The intent and requirement are to generate the societal acceptance and support that controlling institutions need to manage contemporary violence adequately-and to guarantee a durable peace. 69 Governments not responsive to the importance of the central strategic problem of controlling the national territory and the population find themselves in a "crisis of governance." They face increasing social violence, criminal anarchy, and eventual overthrow. Solutions to this problem take us beyond training small units for conducting aggressive operations against narco-traffickers to broader professional military education and leader development. Training and doctrine for joint operations . The Colombian military is only now beginning to develop a doctrine for joint operations, which should include the national police; it must use army, navy, and air force assets to reinforce each others' skills and strengths and compensate for weaknesses. Changing mind-sets to develop leader judgment needed to deal effectively with the complex, politically dominated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and multicultural internal conflict in Colombia requires a carefully staffed, phased, and long-term validation, planning, and implementation program at all levels. The recommended basic direction for such an effort is outlined as follows.
Far-reaching improvement in the collection
• First, the study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been the philosophical cornerstone for comprehending the essence of traditional war. It is no less relevant to nontraditional conflict. As examples, nontraditional national interests centering on "well-being" must be carefully defined and implemented. At the same time, the application of all the instruments of national and international power-including the full integration of legitimate civilian partners-as part of a synergistic process to achieve Colombia's political ends has to be rethought and refined.
• Second, in that connection, Colombian police, military, political, and civilian leaders at all levels must acquire the ability to interact collegially and effectively with representatives of international organizations, U.S. civilian agencies, indigenous national civilian agencies, NGOs, local and global news media, and civilian populations. The intent is to achieve unity of effort, not just unity of command.
• Third, in turn, military and nonmilitary leaders at all levels must understand the strategic and political implications of tactical and operational-level actions. They must also understand the ways that military force can be employed to achieve political and psychological ends and understand and accept the ways that political considerations affect the use of force.
• Fourth, leaders at all levels must understand that information can be a force multiplier. At the same time, lack of timely information and intelligence can be a force minimizer. Waiting for higher or other headquarters to provide timely, accurate, and detailed local intelligence has often proved costly in terms of mission achievement and force protection. As a consequence, Colombian professional military education and leader development must foster the idea that commanders have to take responsibility and the initiative for collecting and managing relevant information for their own use.
• Fifth, education and training for contemporary Colombian intranational conflict must prepare military and police personnel at all levels to be effective war-fighters. Political actors such as illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitaries have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional and unconventional weaponry to use for their own purposes. Additionally, because of the highly charged political-psychological environment in which they must work, soldiers and police officers must also display political sensitivity, considerable restraint, and strong discipline.
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A supplementary list of intermediate-level imperatives would focus on the following:
• The power of the interagency process when used correctly and the impotence of unilateral actions, even when "leading in support";
• The notion of indirect engagement versus direct involvement;
• Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of actions;
• The concept of multiple centers of gravity, to include public opinion and leadership;
• The power of information and public diplomacy and the penalties that are paid when these instruments of power are not used, channeled, or harnessed;
• The importance of learning how to defend one's own centers of gravity as well as attacking those of an opponent and the ultimate penalty for not doing so; and again,
• The fact that contemporary conflict is not "limited," it is "total."
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What the Military Must Do: Some Advanced Requirements . As early as 1990, as a follow-on to the Cartegena (Colombia) Summit, a U.S. interagency team headed by Ambassador Edwin G. Corr met with presidents of Andean countries, along with other government officials and representatives of major groups within the private sector, to make recommendations for counter-narcotics assistance to interested governments. The team concluded that a successful response to illegal drug trafficking and production must deal with political, social, cultural, and security ramifications of narcotics problems-not just law enforcement and economic aspects. What was recommended then and is still required is a holistic approach that deals with root causes, enhances legitimate governance, and provides more than cosmetic security throughout a given country.
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These recommendations for success against illegal narcotics trafficking are interestingly similar to those listed in the Implications Sections above. Additionally, there are at least five tasks that could be initiated at any time that do not depend on the accomplishment of the primary and intermediate requirements for relevance in the contemporary security arena.
• Help the Colombian government to identify and correct key strategic political, economic, and social shortcomings;
• Renew the U.S. executive-legislative understanding of the purpose of security assistance by recommending carefully constructed conditions as guidelines for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in accordance with the realities of contemporary conflict;
• Recommend the repeal of the legal prohibition against most U.S. aid to foreign police;
• Replace U.S. operationally oriented officers with Foreign Area Officer (FAO) diagnosticians to design and manage indirect and direct security assistance programs; and,
• Ensure that direct and indirect military aid to the Colombian government makes a direct contribution to the strategic objectives of promoting democracy, human rights, economic development, social justice, personal and collective security, and a durable peace for the entire country.
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To quote Ambassador Passage again, "If the United States is serious about wanting to see a reduction in the production and trafficking in illegal narcotics, it needs to accept the fact that no reduction is likely until the Colombian government regains control of its national territory and is able to deal with narco-traffickers on the basis of law." 75 At the same time Passage says, "If the United States is serious about wanting to see a reduction in human rights abuses, it should offer training programs to help professionalize both Colombia's police and military forces so than neither of them believes it has to resort to human rights abuses and deny civil liberties in order to enforce laws and maintain public order." 76 It must be remembered, however, that the United States can help Colombia's government and armed forces evaluate shortcomings and overcome them by providing advice, training, education, and equipment. Yet, the changes necessary to take control of the national territory will occur only if the Colombians want U.S. help-and are willing to apply the lessons learned from their own and U.S. experience.
A Cautionary Concluding Note . The above outline of fundamental strategic recommendations, additional strategic and high operational-level imperatives, and the professional military education and leader development imperatives for the strategic adaptation of U.S. military power to the Colombian security situation takes us back to where we began. This list of recommendations for "what is to be done" provides the basis for the understanding and judgment that civilian and military leaders must have to be clear on what the situation in Colombia is and what it is not. The hard evidence over time underscores the wisdom of Clausewitz's dictum, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."
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These recommendations for the adaptation of U.S. civil and military efficacy to the crisis in Colombia take us beyond doing "something" for something's sake. They take us beyond developing budgets, force structure, and equipment packages for a given crisis situation. They take us beyond asking, "What are we going to do?" "Who is going to command and control the effort?" "How is it to be done?" These imperatives take us to the development of a mutually agreed-upon strategic vision (that is, the political end-game). In turn, these imperatives take us to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and implementation of the objectives (strategic ends), ways (strategic courses of action), and means (strategic monetary, personnel, and equipment resources) that directly support the achievement of the political end-game. 78 There is very little glamour, only a few sound bites, and not many career enhancement possibilities inherent in much of the work outlined above, but it does have great potential for directing progress toward democracy, stability, and a sustainable peace.
The Challenge, the Task, and Threat.
The primary challenge is for senior civilian and military leaders to change perspectives and realize that putting money, personnel, and equipment into a situation such as that in Colombia without first doing the fundamentals will result in ad hoc, piecemeal, disjointed, premature-and over the long term, ineffective-reactions to problems.
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The main task includes four sub-tasks. The first is to develop an adequate intellectual framework (strategic paradigm) to deal with Colombia's Hobbesian trinity and its root causes. The second is to promulgate adequate organizational structure to generate international, U.S., and U.S.-Colombian unity of effort. The third is to develop appropriate instruments of hard and soft power for political and psychological as well as military purposes. The fourth task is to generate strong international, U.S., U.S.-Colombian, and regional public understanding and support that will guarantee all parties the ability to stay the course. 80 The danger is that unless responses are highly cooperative, carefully coordinated, well-organized, and conducted with considerable political skill, strategic ambiguity is introduced into the situation. In a situation such as that in Colombia, strategic ambiguity (1) provides the opportunity for opponents to "play at the seams" and frustrate objectives; (2) allows friends and allies to pursue their own narrow agendas; (3) allows political, personnel, and monetary costs to rise; and (4) increases the probability of failure and unnecessary loss of life.
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Conclusions.
Two fundamental sets of requirements underlie this discussion. The first is the need for Colombian leaders to learn how to optimize capabilities in an ambiguous, nontraditional, and intranational security environment. The second involves U.S.-Colombian-international political partnership requirements to achieve civil-military and national-international unity of effort. Together, these two sets of requirements are essential for strategic clarity and success in complex stability operations. It must be remembered that the final outcome of a conflict such as that in Colombia is not determined simply by the manipulation of violence on a traditional battlefield. Rather, control of the entire situation and its successful resolution are determined by the qualitative judgments and unity of effort that directly support overriding political requirements.
Some Final Reflections.
The primary verities and implications of the security situation in the Western Hemisphere and Colombia are clear. First, the world has seen and will continue to see a wide range of ambiguous and uncomfortable threats in the gray area between war and peace. Second, these threats and challenges-manifested by transnational illegal drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, terrorism, warlordism, insurgency, civil war, regional wars, and humanitarian problems such as large-scale refugee flows and famine-are the consequences of root cause pressures and problems perpetrated and/or exploited by a variety of internal and transnational political actors. Third, the spillover effects of Colombian gray area phenomena into the rest of the hemisphere ultimately place demands on the international community, if not to solve the problems, at least to harbor the victims. 82 The policy implications for the United States and the Western community-and their military and police organizations-regarding the illegal transnational narcotics trade in Colombia are far-reaching. Probably the most important, from a U.S. policy perspective, is that the fragile democracy in that country is at risk. Of equal importance from the perspectives of both U.S. and Colombian policy and practicability, the various internal and transnational threats posed by illegal drug trafficking-and the violence stemming from it-are being overlooked and evaded at the macro-strategic level. The result is a series of tactical and operational "successes" on the battlefield over the past 40 years that are irrelevant to the strategic whole.
Lessons learned for virtually every conflict over the 40 years from Algeria, to El Salvador, to Somalia, to the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate that the situation in Colombia requires the greatest international, U.S.-Colombian, civil-military, and military-to-military diplomacy, cooperation, and synergism. 83 These recommended multidimensional integrative efforts at the strategic and high-operational levels will lead to the establishment of conditions that will allow Colombia to renew its political solvency and legitimacy-and that will lead to the achievement of a mutually agreed-upon mandate for sustainable peace.
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